

THIRD RACE AND THIRD CULTURE
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN PENTECOSTAL COLLEGES: THE
VIEW FROM AUSTRALIA

Mark Hutchinson

The problem that the theological colleges face is not the possibility of academic freedom but secularist assumptions that faith commitments are inherently irrational and not open to genuine academic research.'

The issue of academic freedom in religious institutions is a fiercely debated one. We mostly hear the echoes from a divided United States, where public funding is at stake, but the reactions from the temples of science are also apparent in Australia.² There are clearly different circumstances pertaining to place -- and so what I have to say here will perhaps be more relevant to some people, and less to others. As Niall Ormerod has recently suggested, 'academic freedom will always mean different things in different academic contexts.'³ The relationship between British and American systems, and now increasingly the Bologna process in Europe, is complex in a global setting. Whereas the systems once lived in proud isolation, they now influence one another,

¹ Neil Ormerod, 'Academic Freedom in a Theological Context', *Occasional Paper* Number 4. Australian College of Theology, July 2008, p.1.

² As Snyder notes of a 2003 AAUP conference in San Diego called to discuss religious limitations on academic freedom, 'definitive solutions were hard to come by', "Academic freedom and religion", *Academe*, May/June 2003. That AAUP did not really 'get' what the religious colleges were saying can be read into such language as the fact that they "aspire to educational excellence", or question as to whether intelligent design could be 'appropriately segregated ... as "non-science"'. Even the reporting of the event is 'condescending and dismissive'. See Conrad Russell, *Academic Freedom*. Routledge; New York, 1993, p. ix.

³ Ormerod, 'Academic Freedom in a Theological Context', p.1.

if only because of the significant exchange of students and the monetary value which comes from educational services export. It is suitable we are meeting today in Singapore, which is at the crossroads of these confluences, which has expressed the growth of educational export as a national priority, and which has experience of all the major global educational systems. For churches such as our own, there are additional layers of complexity which emerge from our own global networks of church relationships, some of which have to do with local conditions, but many of which have to do with historical missionary links. This presents something of a challenge for our colleges into the future -- as national education frameworks become increasingly regulated and pitched against external quality markers, and as the larger global theological players begin to pitch into what we once considered was our own particular clientele, the issue of standards and the ability to defend academic freedom in a theological context will become an increasingly fraught issue.

There are, however, fundamental issues in common with each other which continue to crop up. One often hears from religious colleges, for example, about the constitutional right to free expression (despite the lack of a formal constitutional framework for rights in many Commonwealth countries), while on the other hand, secularists stand on the separation of church and state. Both have assumptions about what the normal state is. Religious people hold that their faith is an integral part of their freedom, an objective and public thing. Secular commentators, on the other hand, see it as a form of aberrance, a set of private choices that should not be forced upon others. Religious people object to having to pay for atheistic alternatives, while at the same time being squeezed out of consideration as being 'normal' citizens; secular people, on the other hand, closely define the nature of the state in order to protect the dominance of the liberal ideal and the power of its elites. The latter absolutize epistemological liberalism as a form of knowledge,⁴ and use the debate over academic freedom in order to deny public funding to private institutions, categorically stating that religious institutions cannot sustain a culture of academic freedom. The

⁴ Kemp notes that epistemological liberalism has to presuppositions, fallibilism (ie. that all old conceptions need to be falsified and adjusted to new knowledge) and the free market of ideas. This has consequences for institutions holding that revelation is a proper source for knowledge. And see Theodore M. Hesburgh, CSC, *The Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, p. 4, quoted in Briel, about the assumed normativity of pure, methodological rationality.

public debates about creationism and intelligent design, therefore, are often ways of using the religious extreme to define a secular, 'sensible' middle.⁵ It is, in short, a means of social control. It is no coincidence that those who are currently in the leadership of major universities were born in the 1940s and 1950s, and grew up in the 1960s and 1970s. We would not be so harsh as Roche, in saying that:

the most significant threat to freedom of ideas on campus has come not from without, from federal, state, or private assault, but--and increasingly since the "Cultural Revolution" of the late Sixties--from within, usually instigated by ex-New Left professors trying to regain the illusion of a revolutionary virility.⁶

It would be fair to say, however, that the current leadership of the secular academic establishment share assumptions as to the nature of academic freedom, which coincides with their moral individualism and their presuppositions about the normality of economic growth.⁷ As Nicholas Wolterstorff, Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University, has pointed out, this produces strange anomalies.

⁵ See 'Intelligent design and academic freedom', *All Things Considered*. Washington. D.C.: Nov 10, 2005, p.1, which outlines the process by which divergent voices in the secular academy are "investigated and discredited" in order to retain secularist assumptions in the scientific establishment.

⁶ John P. Roche, "The New Left Vigilantes: Academic Freedom", *National Review*, vol. 41, no. 23, December 8, 1989, p. 34.

Russell, *Academic Freedom*, p.18: "The question we face now is whether the slow-down in western economic growth since the oil crisis of 1973, like Henry VIII's divorce, has marked the beginning of another Little Ice Age for academic freedom." In unpacking the economic underpinnings of academic freedom in American universities, Huer notes that professors "routinely expect the comfort and security entailed in tenure, and their expectation is absolutely and unconditionally expressed. But why would they consider anything required in exchange so outrageous?" Jon Huer, *Tenure for Socrates: A Study in the Betrayal of the American Professor*. New York: Bergin & Gamey, 1991, p. xiii. Gleason points out that the 1960s were a concatenation of intellectual crises within, as well as without, the Catholic Church – and documents the rash of academic freedom cases which followed Hans Kung's tour of North America in 1963, during Vatican II. Philip Gleason, *Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 306.

Ours is a liberal democratic society and in a liberal democratic society the state is to refrain from inducting its citizens into any comprehensive perspective on God and the good... A consequence is that in this country there's nothing an academic is free to teach in the public educational sector that he is not free to teach somewhere in the private educational sector, whereas the converse is not true. There are many things an academic is free to teach somewhere in the private educational sector that he is not free to teach in the public sector. ... There is more academic freedom in the private sector of the American educational system than there is in the public, a point that is seldom made in discussions about the topic.⁸

In fact, there are significant restrictions on academic free speech in all settings – as Stanley Fish quips in a book title, 'There's no such thing as free speech, and it's a good thing too.'⁹ This reality of contested meanings of freedom is one of which few Pentecostals have experience (we prefer to stay behind the protective walls of our churches), but into which we are now entering. As Pentecostals (through class shift, and through the increasing universalism of the public gaze) begin to move into this sector, we need to learn from the experience of others. We are not destined simply to 'fight the last war all over again' (as Michael Hollerich describes the situation for the

⁸ Lori Scott Fogleman, "Baylor Hosts National Conference On Academic Freedom", April 6, 2000, www.baylor.edu/pr/news.php?action=story&story=3697. Indeed, as Hoye notes, there is an argument to be made that the movement towards Enlightenment and through to Modernity implied a decline in philosophical liberty – 'whereas the authorities of the Enlightenment wanted to define thought, the Inquisition had wanted only to regulate speech.' (Hoye, 'The Religious Roots').

⁹ Fish notes that the old liberal ploy of declaring for freedom of expression worked when they weren't the establishment, because it undermined the establishment. After they became the establishment, however, the ploy has begun to backfire and provide solace to their enemies: "'Free speech" is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish to advance; and we give our preferred verbal behaviors that name when we can, when we have the power to do so, because in the rhetoric of American life, the label "free speech" is the one you want your favorites to wear.' S. Fish, *There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It's a Good Thing Too*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 102.

Catholic College sector).¹⁰ We have the advantage of not having to work with 2000 years of entrenched doctrine and autocracy, and the fights that have gone with it. We have the disadvantage of an experience gap in the culture wars which have featured the Australian scene since its foundation as a child of the Enlightenment. For us the largest feature on our horizon is the powers that be. We have not yet begun to see the giants in the land across the river. Speaking for those who have been there, Hollerich notes that the largest issue facing communities of Christian scholars is not the restrictiveness of their churches, but the implicit benchmarking of our disciplines against secular norms:

given the demonstrable course of secularization in higher education, it is our religious identity which is far more fragile and at risk at the hands of our academic and professional goals, rather than the other way around."

¹⁰ M. Hollerich, 'Academic Freedom and the Catholic University', Catholic Studies, University of St. Thomas.

¹¹ Hollerich, 'Academic Freedom'. As Shils notes, the 'prevailing tradition' of scholarship restricts academic freedom unless a scholar can prove otherwise. This has profound ramifications for Christian creationism, for example: 'Astrological propositions about the determination of the fortunes of individuals by stellar configurations, or assertions that the British Isles were originally settled by the lost tribes of Israel, or beliefs that the cosmos and human species were created within six days are not generally acknowledged as falling within the legitimate range of ideas that academics are free to assert. Such propositions do not come under the protection of academic freedom.' Some disciplines – such as Theology, Bible etc – are not simply resolvable into secular equivalents (i.e. Christian Theology does not simply become 'philosophizing about God'). Shils, quoted in Kemp, 'What is Academic Freedom.' As Kemp notes, the notion of the 'prevailing tradition' is merely a way of maintaining liberal dominance in the disciplines, by excluding other forms of authority. Kinney notes the 'aura of intimidation' in the secular academy against unpopular views. Kinney, 'Assessing the threat.' Marsden notes the 'ranking' of Christian institutions by the 'prevailing secular national standard,' and resulting in the assumption of 'inauthenticity' and inferiority. Marsden, 'Liberating.' Nuechterlein, speaking of a case at Concordia Seminary, the secular academic establishment engages in 'no mere exercise in neutral taxonomy', but 'those institutions that do operate with restrictions are visited by the AAUP with intellectual ostracism and academic sanctions'. James Nuechterlein, 'The Idol of Academic Freedom,' *First Things* 38 (December 1993): 12-16. Huer notes that the system which pretends to exist for truth in fact exists to serve the narrow interests of a knowledge class: 'Every

Baylor University provost, David Jeffery, suggests that the major threat arises from the tension between individualist and communalist values in western societies: 'The issue is that relationships between the institution as a community and individuals seeking their own individual freedoms within the community are more strained than they used to be.'¹² The freedom of the academic is based on a concept of the 'selfless' search for truth – a claim hard to sustain in individualistic west, where everything we do implies a prime regard for the self and its rights. We also have to be aware of wider social trends. Recent pressure in the United States for an Academic Bill of Rights to protect the rights of students to demur from the opinions of their professors has both good and bad outcomes. On the one hand, it protects religious students against secularizing tendencies in secular universities. On the other, it makes it harder for a lecturer to simply say 'you are wrong' on the basis of their expert opinion. In other words, the classroom (even in private institutions on this side of the world) could well increasingly become a place where 'freedom' becomes a legal issue.¹³ Defining the nature of behaviour both by staff and students, and of constituency members who are observing the defined 'freedom of debate' which is essential to a campus, will take some thought. It reminds us however that academic freedom is not just about staff – it is also about the right of students to inquire and to learn in ways that include self-directed learning as people 'responsible to themselves'.¹⁴

Freedom relates to the frame of being – what is the space (in which we are located) *for*, how does that help me construct my God-given vocation, and (therefore) what are the appropriate freedoms which relate to that space? This is difficult in Christian institutions of higher

system exists to exist, it has been said. By doing his daily routine, a professor only serves a system that serves itself, and nothing else.' Huer, *Tenure for Socrates*, p.196.

¹² V Marsh Kabat, 'Academic And Religious Freedom', Baylor University, www.baylor.edu.

¹³ CCCU Committee on Education and the Workforce, 'Academic Freedom Victory', 24 June 2005, www.cccu.org.

¹⁴ Kemp notes that this is the older German idea of *Lemfreiheit*, a 'striving after science of their own free wills', which became the basis for the elective system when it was imported into America. It is a model of education implied by government legislation such as 'fee help', itself a development of the West Report's recommendation towards the foundation of a voucher system. Kemp, 'What is Academic Freedom?'

education for a number of reasons. The first is that there is some doubt out in the republic of letters that the university can, *per se*, fulfill a meaningful role in the modern world.¹⁵ Given that we can answer this, the problem of Christian liberal arts colleges and universities arises because there are multiple demands on an institution, multiple accounts as to why they exist. Again, we can learn from others. It would be my contention that most of the conflicts in overseas religious institutions have emerged from conflict in the core values of the institutions themselves. Every now and again, an academic will do something stupid – we are just people, after all. But the majority of the conflicts seem to arise either through a change in direction in an institution – where what was actually a core tenet of a college changed (perhaps through change of leadership), creating dissonance on the campus between the old and the new – or through the leadership selecting one of a number of existing core values as substantive, effectively dismissing other possible interpretations. Hollerich notes, for example, that while the public reason for Catholic Colleges in the 19th century was the teaching of Catholic faith, the actual reason was to encourage the 'upward mobility of the Catholic population' by engaging with the educational possibilities emerging from the secular sciences and the professions. Not surprisingly, through the twentieth century, the public and the social values underpinning the Colleges' existence came into conflict, leading to on-campus conflict over academic freedom involving people who were really wrestling over the nature of what a Catholic College was.¹⁶ So, defining "who we are," agreeing to "*be* who we say we are." and "*being* who we are," are important steps towards a proper sense of academic freedom in Pentecostal institutions of higher education. Making the terms of this compact apparent to incoming staff is also essential. Are we to search for truth wherever it may lead us? Is it our purpose, too, 'to include the moral, spiritual and religious dimension in [our] research. and to evaluate the attainments of

¹⁵ Don J Briel, 'Prospects for the Catholic University in a Secular Age', Address on the occasion of the Inauguration of the Academic Year 1999-2000 at the Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas – Rome. The concept of the university begins in the 'studium generale': as Hoye notes:- 'It was by their internationality. their catholicity, that the original universities, as distinct from other places of study, were defined. In other words, a university was a school defined by the boundaries of Christendom.' Hoye, 'The Religious Roots'.

¹⁶ Hollerich, 'Academic Freedom and the Catholic University'. And indeed, as James Nuechterlein points out, what a 'Lutheran', or other religious college is: "Athens and Jerusalem in Indiana", *American Scholar* 57 (1988) no. 3:353-68.

science and technology in the perspective of the totality of the human person'?¹⁷ If so, then we need to agree on our purposes and structure ourselves accordingly. The consequences reach into almost every part of our operations.

Defining Academic Freedom

The concept of academic freedom varies slightly from culture to culture. With a strong public welfare infrastructure, British and German concerns are more interested in the individual-institution tension, particularly as they draw their traditions of academic freedom directly from the medieval corporate structures established to protect the universalist pursuits of scholars from the vagaries of contending local corporations, in particular municipal corporations, and Kings-in-Council.¹⁸ The first mention of the term academic freedom is in 1220 by a Pope (Honorius III) who encouraged the university in Bologna to defend its "scholastic freedom" (*libertas scolastica*) against the local government.¹⁹ Universities developed out of the presuppositions inherent in Christendom: 'the unconditional exaltation of truth and the supranational character of the papacy.'²⁰ In this setting, the European approach to academic freedom has been defined as:

The freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions. (Academic Freedom amendment to Education

¹⁷ *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.

¹⁸ Hoye explores this through the case of Christian Wolf, who summarized the principle of academic freedom in the statement: 'that in regard to judgments about truth one be led not by others but by oneself.' William J. Hoye, 'The Religious Roots of Academic freedom', *Theological Studies*, vol. 58, no. 3, 1997, p.411. The universalist pretensions of scholars are summed up in such concepts as 'the republic of letters', and the 'common good'. In fact both are claims not to be participants in the particular good of their culture or institution, and result largely in academic individualism.

¹⁹ Hoye, 'The Religious Roots'.

²⁰ Hoye, 'The Religious Roots'.

Reform Bill, moved by Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, 19 May 1988)"

It is seen as something which emerges from the nature of being a scholar, and the scholar's role in Western society, i.e. it is not an inalienable privilege, but a functional constituent of scholarship itself. Coherent with the right of the scholar is the right of the educational institution itself to "be able to set their own standards, free from undue outside interference." "Community (Christendom) defines *institution* defines *scholarship*, each with its rights and freedoms. As Ormerod has recently pointed out, 'academic freedom is freedom from forces which are external to the internal requirements of the discipline. The question ... [is] whether an ecclesial interest in the work of theologians is internal or external to the requirements of the discipline?'²³ Again, the answer to this question differs from place to place. What would not be questioned in terms of the involvement of, say, the accounting profession in the teaching of its discipline, *is* questioned in Australia and the United States when it comes to theology. (The reason is, of course, is that secularists can never admit that theology is a practical discipline - hence the continuous campaign against the public expressions of churches, such as Pentecostal megachurches, who seem to be running against the trend specified by secularization theory). With deeper roots, European institutions have struck a different balance as to the influence of external constituencies on the teaching of their disciplines.

By comparison, American concerns – rooted in a consolidated national culture – relate to the absolute rights (or limitation thereof) of the *individual* scholar as an *individual*.²⁴ Australia stands somewhere in between (indicating why we cannot simply absorb American models

²¹ Quoted in Russell, *Academic Freedom*, p. vi.

²² Marsden, 'Liberating'.

²³ Ormerod, 'Academic Freedom in a Theological Context', p. 3.

²⁴ As Briel notes: 'The American understanding of freedom as a private right has the unfortunate tendency to place this discussion very quickly in a quagmire, one perhaps unexpectedly identified by D. H. Lawrence, surely no Catholic restorationist, who sharply criticized the naïveté of American accounts of freedom when he pointed out that as human persons we are free only when we "belong to a living, organic, believing community, active in fulfilling some unfulfilled, perhaps unrealized purpose."'

of higher education uncritically).²⁵ As the Curtin University approach notes, academic freedom is framed by the role of the academic (i.e. it is not a freedom applied to the person, so much as to their role as 'a staff member', 'a citizen, a member of a learned profession and an employee of the University.')²⁶ In other words, 'freedom' is applied within the constraints of community definitions and recognitions. The community is both an economic (institutional) and a social (interpersonal) reality. Given this self-understanding, the university therefore binds itself to recognize certain rights inherent in the position:

An academic staff member may speak, write and publish, or artistically perform, create and exhibit, without being subject to institutional censorship or discipline. However, an academic staff member's special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a person of learning and an educator, an academic staff member must be cognisant that the public may judge the profession and/or the University by what has been said or written. (Appendix 1)

The continuity between this and the provisions of the Catholic Church's ruling statement about academic freedom within the system of pontifical institutions worldwide is apparent. In *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, John Paul II defined academic freedom as:

a certain promise, given to those who teach and conduct research, that they may, within their own particular area of knowledge and in accordance with the methods proper to that area, seek the truth wherever inquiry and evidence lead them, and to teach and publish the results of that inquiry, keeping in mind the aforementioned considerations, namely, that personal and community rights within the requirements of truth and the common good be protected.²⁷

²⁵ Note Briel, who quotes Buckley (Michael Buckley, SJ, "The Catholic University and the Promise Inherent in Its Identity," *Catholic Universities in Church and Society*, 1993, p.77) to suggest that most North American Catholic universities "do not advance much beyond American civil religion and a committed social ethic."

²⁶ Academic Freedom Policy, Curtin University, Commencement Date: 27 July 2005

²⁷ Quoted in K W Kemp, 'What is Academic Freedom?', St Thomas University.

The elements of, promise, membership, discipline, commitment to truth, search, dissemination, and the common good, are common to both secular and religious constituencies. How we structure promise, membership and discipline, therefore, are fundamental to the outward signs of commitment to truth, search, dissemination, and the common good. The implication is obvious – academic freedom needs to include a balance of the freedoms of the student, the teacher, the body of teachers reasoning together, and the institution as an entity existing within a larger community.²⁸ Academic freedom is 'an instrumental good' provided so that the institution and its staff can pursue its proper ends, i.e., "to contribute to the growth of the body of truthful propositions and to this body's transmission to contemporary and oncoming generations."²⁹ That which interferes with its instrumentality also by definition interferes with the extension of academic freedom as a right. (Allowance for processes of mediation and a definition of 'appropriate authority' and 'appropriate interlocutors' to be involved in academic discussions is a natural consequence of this.)

Pentecostal Reflections

Pentecostalism varies quite widely around the world. It varies in terms of its social position, in terms of its ready access to institutions and its relationship to the institutionalization cycle, and therefore in terms of the relative roles of the various gifts in the church. The United States, for instance, assumes a professionalised Ministry, with a role for the teaching gift, which is not to be found in Australia. In Asian cultures, Confucian or paternalist presumptions regulate the roles played by pastors, teachers, evangelists, etc. One therefore has to be careful in generalising. It would be true to say that, in Australia at

²⁸ The issue thus arises as to who gets to choose where the balance is. Imposition of an external standard creates cultural problems – as the Catholic review *America* noted about *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*: Any "attempt to impose a monolithic juridical framework on the Catholic colleges and universities of the United States will not enhance their Catholic identity, but only endanger it by forcing unnecessary choices between loss of official church approval and a marginal role in American higher education." Editorial, 'New Norms for Catholic Higher Education: Unworkable and Dangerous', *America*, November 14, 1998.

²⁹ Edward Shils, "Academic Freedom," in Philip G. Altbach, ed., *International Higher Education: An Encyclopedia* (Garland, 1991), I:1-22, here pp. 3 and 4, quoted in Kemp, 'What is Academic Freedom?'

least, most leaders in our movement have little understanding of educational processes, and little expectation about the intelligence of their members. The model of the charismatic leader is to hear from God and to tell the people what has been heard. The concept that they may be in fact serving a community which can hear from God and which is capable of dealing with what they've heard is not a common one. And yet, the community model is precisely what a uni-versity is – it is a community of scholarship. With the prevailing church model, education tends to default towards indoctrination, with more emphasis on character outcomes and opinions than on intellectual formation and knowledge. Unlike the significant Christian university sector in United States, we in Australia "don't yet have a paradigm of what a church-related university (or liberal arts college) ought to look like",³⁰ and are indeed in the process of inventing one. The outcome of this is that there is inevitable tension between the functions of such an institution and the existing model. All parties will need to admit that a college exists as a place where definite, charismatic, revelational knowledge and certainty exist alongside and in interaction with the indefinite but progressive search for truth.³¹ It is not an unusual tension in our tradition. Our doctrine of salvation is a case in point: we are saved at a moment in time, and yet we are being saved until we enter into the fullness of the promise which is kept for us in Christ. The tension between present authority and knowledge and emerging understanding will be definitional to what we are trying to build. Leaders and pastors will have to acknowledge that their revelational knowledge and ecclesial authority is not absolute, while teachers will have to admit that their academic freedom and scholarly knowledge are not absolute goods. Absolutized power corrupts the process of coming to know, while absolutized knowledge "makes us our own centre".³² As Hoye

³⁰ Vicki Marsh Kabat, 'Identity Crisis', in *Baylor Magazine*, vol. 3, no. 4 (February 2005), <http://www.baylormag.com/story.php?story=005617>

³¹ The Catholic Church notes a similar tension between magisterium and the academic search, meaning that a Catholic university's privileged task is "to unite existentially by intellectual effort two orders of reality that too frequently tend to be placed in opposition as if they were antithetical: the search for truth and the certainty of already knowing the fount of truth." (Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 1,3); "a Catholic university is completely dedicated to the research of all aspects of truth in their essential connection with the supreme truth, which is God." (Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 4)

³² Briel, 'Prospects'.

notes, in an academic institution, 'respect for authorities cannot imply being against truth'.³³

On occasion, no doubt we will find ourselves discussing matters and disagreeing, not because both parties are not Christian, but because both parties have different understandings as to the nature of learning. The question, "What is the relationship between indoctrination and education?" is a subset of the question of "What is the relationship between truth and fact." They obviously overlap, but they are not identical, and clearly the purposes of a university or liberal arts college tend more towards education than towards indoctrination. Once one steps out of the undergraduate program into graduate and research programs, the difference between the two becomes even more marked. Unlike the current church model, there needs to be space for disagreement and 'learning together'. (Indeed, there is something that the contemporary church model could learn from the college model, without trying to turn the church into a college, or the college into a church). Like the church model, however, that space is not limitless. It needs to be governed by laws of charity and mutual commitment. It cannot be legislated in its daily functioning. The American experience of the use of the *mandatum* in the Catholic church to regulate the teachers of Catholic doctrine, should teach us that legislation does not work. It does not work because of who academics are – they are by nature curious, intelligent people, who know whether a text is being interpreted in ways true to its origins or as a means of control. This is not merely their nature, but their job – and indeed, many have traded off better paying pursuits for the opportunity to serve in environments where their faith perspective is given freedom. It also does not work because of what the Church is: any religion which has at its core sentiments like 'if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed' will have problems with merely legal proscription. It does not work because of what the academy is, and the community standards which are expected of academics in accredited institutions. A preferred approach is that, rather than the positive requirement to seek approval and licensing, an internal representation process and continuous conversation be established with the supporting community. Pentecostal churches and colleges need to develop a conversation in place of the tendency to monologue.

Directions

³³ Hoye, 'The Religious Roots...'

There will clearly need to be some mandated areas of freedom of operation and responsibility written into the charter Pentecostal colleges. When President of Baylor University, Herbert H. Reynolds, was planning the future of that institution, he came to the conclusion that he could not sit back and watch the University be taken over by ultra-conservative Baptists who are "more interested in indoctrination than education and enlightenment".³⁴ There needs to be agreement on issues of the integration of faith and learning and what a sufficient basis of faith for such an institution would be, given that it is designed to serve (in the first instance) a Pentecostal constituency. That constituency is not itself in agreement as to what a natural theology would look like from a Pentecostal perspective, nor does it hold an agreed model of knowledge, but rather it holds together conflicting models in tension – a fundamentalist literalism on one hand, and a commitment to the freedom of the Spirit in continuing revelation on the other.³⁵ We do have the advantage of not having fought lengthy wars over issues of fundamentalism, and therefore we are not carrying as much baggage as other traditions. (Though this too varies around the world.) On the other hand, we are often pragmatic in our usage of other people's discoveries and knowledge, without really exploring what is behind them, while at the same time going on crusades about issues that are often minor when one of the markers of our identity is touched. When our own constituency cannot agree over such matters, how can Colleges, which are service institutions, agree? When the context in which we live constructs ideologies by drawing a very sharp line between Christian and secular enlightenment options, how can we expect to find agreement? At the same time, it is important that we do not set the standard at a lowest common denominator that will allow

³⁴ Kabat, 'Identity Crisis'

³⁵ Shane Clifton is leading the charge on bringing about a better understanding about key issues as to 'what is the church?', an important question if we are to maintain the institutional freedoms of a university which is not simply the subject of every wind of influence, the next telephone call that the administration receives from one or another significant pastor. Catholic colleges speak about the concept of a 'true autonomy', which creates the space for proper academic freedom. In the Catholic case the shape of that space is made easier to find by the fact that the nature of the 'Pontifical university' is defined in canon law. There is no such existing definition of our relationship to the National Executive of the AOG, who are our legal owners. It could be argued that SCC is the Pentecostal equivalent to a pontifical institution – or not.

the institution to, over time, cease to be Christian. Qualities of heart and mind, of spirit and character, as well as mere intellectual ability, are relevant elements in the process of hiring and preferring staff. They are also critical elements of the classroom encounter. We have to treasure diversity, because we're a learning institution, and an institution without an engagement with diversity cannot learn. At the same time, diversity is not an end point so much as a means. As Marsden notes, 'The conventional wisdom that one has to be in a highly diverse atmosphere in order to have a creative intellectual environment is simply wrong.'³⁶ It will, however, be necessary to hire people who have trained outside church institutions. This is not only something driven by the law of the market (PhDs are rare, and therefore demand a higher exchange value, either in cultural or in economic terms), but it is also *desirable*, given that knowledge is pitched against the entire range of those who know a particular discipline well, not just those who find themselves within church-based institutions. With one of the lowest educational attainment rates of all Christian denominations, Pentecostals (at least in my country) will for some time need to look outside their own pool. This is something that can be solved either with time (we 'grow our own'), or money (we hire in experts from Pentecostal institutions elsewhere in the world) –neither of which, however, is in plentiful supply.

Once we agree, then we need to be able to stand on what we have agreed. On the one hand, faculty who work in a Pentecostal college cannot always be looking over their shoulders, ready with an apology to their discipline for who we Pentecostals are. Being Pentecostal is a given part of being a Pentecostal scholar, and one of our principal audiences must be the Church.³⁷ On the other hand, the university administration cannot be always looking back over their shoulders, ready with an apology to their church and denominational leaders for who we scholars are. We are by definition not a church – and that is OK. We are by definition not a secular university – and that is OK too. Conflict begins with an *a priori* disposition to defend some unshared, and inalienable position. Scholars need to protect both their discipline and their faith-based identity; and university administrations need to

³⁶ George M Marsden, 'Liberating Academic Freedom', *First Things* 88 (December 1998): 11-14.

³⁷ 'James T. Burtchaell has argued that the Catholic university must understand itself as an academic household of the faith. That is, that one of its principal audiences must be the Church.', Briel, 'Prospects'.

help them do it. It is neither for the scholar nor the administrator to use the principles of academic freedom as a lever to detach the institution from the constituency that it serves, the community which gives it its mandate. Their vocation is defined as serving "the religious university's dual nature as both a community of inquiry (Athens) and a community of conviction (Jerusalem)."³⁸ Moreover, scholars need to be able to work freely (the reason they are scholars) within an agreed faith environment (the reason they are *Christian* scholars). Administrators will face the difficulty of working out of the church perspective. Scholars are not assistant pastors, and relationships with them need to hold in mind their expertise, ability and calling. The patronizing attitude of many senior pastors to teaching staff which I personally have witnessed is a hangover of a period when teaching staff were essentially pastors not presently doing something else. On the other hand, we have to admit that the 'god-professor' model has done untold harm to church-based institutions in the past. The rapprochement between the two cultures comes down to the nature of the third culture (just as leading Christian Ancient Historian Edwin Judge, speaks of Christians as the Third Race), the type of university culture that we are going to build. In our setting, pastors have taken on the role of vision projectors. Institutions need such input. At the same time, vision is not enough, and academics are essentially in the job of working out the theory of how things work. It will take 'unusual administrative vision' to make the two constituents work together in the Pentecostal context. We need to have faith that just as God can raise up extraordinary pastors and extraordinary teachers he can also raise up extraordinary executives who can negotiate the boundaries between the third race and the third culture. It is our honour in Sydney to have just such an executive, and I have seen it in action elsewhere in the world.

It is the experience of many Christian institutions that an informal creed is in fact in operation, superseding the formal agreements and visions relating to the formation of the institution. Mere dislike or personal disagreement therefore becomes a matter of institution-wide concern, a process which is divisive and destructive. The exchange of knowledge and the process of learning is based on trust (the social taboos related to teacher-student relationships are not merely about dominance and subservience, but also about the knowledge that something fundamentally functional in the learning and humanising process.) Breach of that trust relationship, between teacher and student,

³⁸ Nuechterlein, 'The Idol of Academic Freedom'.

between student and student, or between faculty and executive, destroys the basis on which a learning institution operates. It is for this reason that -- in the past -- the trust relationship has been formally and contractually arranged between staff and their institution, in the form of tenure arrangements. "Tenure", according to the American Association of University Professors,

is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) freedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability.³⁹

In fact, this arrangement has become a measure of academic freedom. The challenge for Pentecostal colleges is that a private institution does not have the same financial flexibility as public institutions, and it must be admitted that tenure provides not only academic freedom, but economic inflexibilities and hiding places for non-productivity. Tenure is the formal means of protecting academic freedom in the world's wealthiest economy, but because of its institutional costs it often counteracts the ends for which it was instituted. As Galbraith notes in his novel, *A Tenured Professor* (1990),

Tenure was originally invented to protect radical professors, those who challenged the accepted order. But we don't have such people anymore at the universities, and the reason is tenure. When the time comes to grant it nowadays, the radicals get screened out. That's its principal function. It's a very good system, really (1990, p. 38).⁴⁰

³⁹ <http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/>

⁴⁰ quoted in William G. Tierney, 'Academic Freedom and Tenure: Between Fiction and Reality', *Journal of Higher Education*, vol.75, no. 2, 2004. Huer notes: 'It is my considered opinion, accumulated after two decades of academic life, that tenure is given to the wrong people for the wrong reason. Those who have it do not need it, and those who need it do not have it. Those who have it do not need it because they do not use it, and those who need it cannot use it because they do not have it.' *Tenure for Socrates*, p.xiii.

Pentecostals will need to be able to demonstrate proper protections for academic freedom, while at the same time realizing the institutional and cultural costs of entrenching an individualist interpretation in tenure. We cannot afford to have 'academic freedom' as a 'transcendent value' if it functionally displaces our real, core, transcendent values and encourages selfishness and subservience. Some form of mutual obligation, entrenched in real relationships, would be a preferable way of running a Christian institution. Whether it is workable in terms of institutional risk reduction is the key question.

In addition to the strengths associated with our lack of history, we also have a number of weaknesses. We share with Catholic institutions the sense of purpose that comes from teaching within a sense of calling, and being less bureaucratic, we are less susceptible (though not immune) to routinization. We do not however have the sense of historic continuity which Catholics or Lutherans have when it comes to working in their colleges and universities. We have no philosophy of vocation for the position of teacher or thinker – which in other traditions is the position filled by the 'doctors of the church' who had the "ius ubique docendi" (the right to teach anywhere). (It is also a set of roles which are in trouble elsewhere – Hollerich talks about the decline of the religious orders, and so the definable carriers of the 'educational apostolate' in Catholicism. In part this is one of the reasons for rising conflict between the bishops and the educational institutions in that system.)⁴¹ For us to have a sense that, through us, the Church 'explores the mysteries of humanity and of the world, clarifying them in the light of Revelation',⁴² we need to clarify where we stand with regard to the spiritual vocation of scholars. Another issue is that we also have no metaphysics and no natural theology with which to protect our endeavours from the prevailing instrumentalization of existence – if the 'triumph of technique' is the story of modernity, then it is also uncomfortably close to being the story of the triumph of western Pentecostalism (or at least, of the megachurches, where 'excellence' has become the highest virtue). Given this modernist

⁴¹ The importance of a theology of vocation can be seen by the fact that most of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* begins in the assumption of what a Christian scholar is: 'By vocation, the *Universitas magistrorum et scholarium* is dedicated to research, to teaching and to the education of students who freely associate with their teachers in a common love of knowledge.' *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, Apostolic Constitution of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II on Catholic Universities, 15 August, 1990.

⁴² *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.

stance among our tradition, do we have an a priori commitment to pursuing the unity of knowledge which is the basis of the 'uni-versity', or are we happy to replicate the fragmentation of knowledge typical of the secular 'multi-versities' which now inhabit the public cultures of the west? If the role of the university is to pursue 'the united endeavour of intelligence and faith [that] will enable people to come to the full measure of their humanity',⁴³ then we have some work to do on our theology of humanity, and our approaches to revelation, intelligence and faith. One of our great dangers is becoming merely a religiously legitimized skills training organization, simply through the pressure of economic necessity. Government moves towards opening up the university sector to competition has, in the minds of many academics in the public sector, already created pressure on standards.⁴⁴ In a college like ours, we do not have the luxury of choosing (as the title of an Australia Institute conference implied in 2001), between 'Enterprise or Academy?'.⁴⁵ We are somehow always both, but have not yet found a model which embraces both in a seamless manner. There is already pressure on staff to keep the student body 'happy' – and, as the Steele case at the University of Wollongong showed, over extension in this direction can undermine an institution's academic credibility in the broader community.⁴⁶ The Fraser case at Macquarie University also underlines the need for freedom to be limited to expertise – i.e. freedom in defined areas within the classroom. Otherwise, academic freedom issues become confused with contextual issues – did Macquarie sack him because he had voided his trust as an

⁴³ *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.

⁴⁴ Reporting on the Australia Institute's report on Academic Freedom and the Commercialisation of the University', in 'Public partnership needed to promote academic freedom,' NTEU Press Release, 16 March 2001, <http://www.nteu.org.au/news/2001/2001/962>.

⁴⁵ P. Kinnear (ed), *The Idea of a University: Enterprise or Academy? Proceedings of a Conference organized by Manning Clark House and The Australia Institute*, September 2001. <http://www.tai.org.au/>

⁴⁶ A member of Wollongong's science faculty; "Steele [was sacked when he] told a journalist that the grades of two of his honours students were upgraded within the department against his recommendations and those of an external referee. Steele and other academics reported such incidents when asked to respond to a national survey in which many academics complained of management pressure to lift students results and produce commercially favourable research in order to generate corporate sponsorship and student fee revenue."

academic, or because he was a threat to the economic lifeline of the university, i.e. Asian students?⁴⁷ (The speed with which he was sacked was remarkable, especially when compared to parallel religious cases – William Kinney, for instance, cites the case of Charles E Curran who, though teaching with 'flagrant disregard' for Church positions on birth control, abortion rights and homosexuality, etc, was not sacked for nearly 20 years after the case came to the attention of authorities.)⁴⁸ Outside the classroom, the scholar has to be able to comment as a private citizen, while needing to practice restraint, accuracy and proper distinction from the views of his or her institution.⁴⁹

Another danger from the economic requirements of a private educational institution is that pressure to keep the ship afloat may also lead us to distinguish between people who can pay and those who can't – undermining the Pentecostal *ethos* of diversity coming into unity through the action of the Holy Spirit. We need to seek a solution in this matter. As Jeffrey notes:

Academic freedom assures faculty the right to research, teach and publish on any topic that is consistent with one's academic field, but there are "projects into which one could be involved which might possibly fall outside what would be acceptable norms ... or which simply price themselves out of mission-related priorities."⁵⁰

Clearly, a proper awareness of the private and corporate demands on a college needs to inform the community discourse on academic freedom.

Given the difference between communal and university cultures, there needs to be a means for mediation which can take place within the church rather than in the civil courts. We do not have bishops as such in the Pentecostal churches, and so need to consider how irreconcilable differences can be dealt with in a reasonable way. As Russell points

⁴⁷ ABC Radio, Counterpoint Program, "Freedom of Speech," <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/counterpoint/stories/s1424337.htm>

Monday 1 August 2005, accessed 5 December 2005.

⁴⁸ William Kinney, 'Assessing the threat to Academic Freedom in the Catholic University', St Thomas University.

⁴⁹ Fraser had a letter published in the local newspaper which was prompted by the settlement of Sudanese refugees in the area.

⁵⁰ Kabat, 'Academic Freedom'.

out, it was the need to create "a figure with buffer status between the rival jurisdictions" having claim on the university that was the origin of the figure of the Chancellor. "He was ... the point in which all theories of power, ecclesiastical and secular, ascending and descending, were blended."⁵¹

Proposals

This paper is only a first step in sparking discussion on this important subject. Flowing from its considerations, we as a scholarly community need to think of ways that we can formalize our thought into appropriate structures. Obvious steps include the following:

- a. We need to be intentional about the political and social context of this key concept (academic freedom), and come up with appropriate theological and biblical underpinnings for our communal compact. As noted above, the key elements of academic freedom include definitions for 'promise [or compact], membership, discipline, commitment to truth, search, dissemination, and the common good.' It would be useful, therefore, if a broader conversation was had which clarified for us Pentecostal approaches to:
 - Community and individuality
 - Church/ecclesiology and its relationship to intermediate institutions such as universities, NGOs etc
 - Vocation, calling and freedom
 - The role of the 'teacher' and 'scholarship' in Pentecostal churches, and in the movement in general
 - The secular State, and social membership/ action/ change
 - The nature of truth, inspiration, and the value of the natural world; the relationship between faith and learning
 - Diversity and interfaith dialogue

⁵¹ Russell, *Academic Freedom*, p. 16.

- The market, economic realities, remuneration and consultancy-type work
- b. We need to come to a common definition of what constitutes academic freedom in our ecclesial and collegiate setting, including definitions of the freedoms of the student, the scholar/ teacher, and the institution.
- c. We need clear core values, and to work through and out the other side of implicit values (i.e. Our core values are economic rather than ecclesial). Such values need to be clear, positive, and commonly accepted.
- d. We need to develop appropriate structures which allow for non-punitive conversation and conflict resolution, which are linked to our mutual commitments as community members.
- e. We need to keep working towards appropriate ways of informing staff, before they join the college, of the agreed, expected bases for faith, practice and behaviour.

The aim for Pentecostal colleges is to adapt the traditional Christian '*studium generale*' by re-imagining what education would be under the influence of the Holy Spirit. Such an institution produces scholarship and teaching contributing to God's great plan for the transformation of humanity. We have a very significant journey before us, and it is important that we are as intentional and responsible in our treatment of the issues as is possible. We cannot flee from liberalism so blindly that we end up trapped in the box of irrelevance. We cannot continue providing answers to the old fundamentalism debates when no one is asking the questions. Church and college need to develop a conversation which for both of them charts new territory -- in what is often contested territory -- without losing themselves in the process. The discussion which flows from papers such as this will hopefully help in that process.

Appendix 1: Key Points from a Combined US Statement on Academic Rights and Responsibilities

- American higher education is characterized by a great diversity of institutions, each with its own mission and purpose. This diversity is a central feature and strength of our colleges and universities and must be valued and protected. The particular purpose of each school, as defined by the institution itself, should set the tone for the academic activities undertaken on campus.
- Colleges and universities should welcome intellectual pluralism and the free exchange of ideas. Such a commitment will inevitably encourage debate over complex and difficult issues about which individuals will disagree. Such discussions should be held in an environment characterized by openness, tolerance and civility.
- Academic decisions including grades should be based solely on considerations that are intellectually relevant to the subject matter under consideration. Neither students nor faculty should be disadvantaged or evaluated on the basis of their political opinions. Any member of the campus community who believes he or she has been treated unfairly on academic matters must have access to a clear institutional process by which his or her grievance can be addressed.
- The validity of academic ideas, theories, arguments and views should be measured against the intellectual standards of relevant academic and professional disciplines. Application of these intellectual standards does not mean that all ideas have equal merit. The responsibility to judge the merits of competing academic ideas rests with colleges and universities and is determined by reference to the standards of the academic profession as established by the community of scholars at each institution.

Government's recognition and respect for the independence of colleges and universities is essential for academic and intellectual

excellence. Because colleges and universities have great discretion and autonomy over academic affairs, they have a particular obligation to ensure that academic freedom is protected for all members of the campus community and that academic decisions are based on intellectual standards consistent with the mission of each institution.